Getting a list in a few seconds of anyone in the United States who subscribes to a Middle Eastern newspaper, watches Al-Jazeera, is between the ages of 20 and 35, and who travelled to Washington on the day of a major political demonstration is but a few clicks away. When a bureaucrat at the TIA (Total Information Awareness) or one of its successors performs such a search and you are named by the state, it is not just 'information' that has been gathered. The e-interpellation goes farther than the information separately considered-by the very act of naming you as a suspect (or 'person of interest') you have changed status in the eyes of others who know about this, and if you come to know or fear, in your eyes as well. P Galison and M Minow, 'Our Privacy, Ourselves' 1 In recent years, events such as the attacks of 9/11 and the July 7 London bombings have given rise to major pieces of security legislation in countries like the United Kingdom and the United States. Enacted within months of each other, both the AntiTerrorism, Crime and Security Act (2001) and the USA PATRIOT Act (2001) contain a range of provisions aimed at increasing the ability of the police, security services and other law enforcement agencies to detect and combat terrorist activities. 2 The enactment of these Acts, which have been hailed by politicians on both sides of the Atlantic as vital weapons in the 'war on terror', can be directly linked to recent largescale terrorist events. However, many of the reforms ushered in by these pieces of legislation-although unusually bold and certainly unprecedented in terms of their scope-have largely been in keeping with established trends in the expansion of state power and the decline of privacy in the last years of the twentieth century. In particular, both Acts have led to a marked acceleration in the already rapid growth of existing surveillance networks in the UK and the US. Moreover, the Acts have played a key role in breaking down barriers between various law enforcement agencies, as well as between state and non-state organisations-increasing the ease with which personal information can be exchanged.
Aside from significantly expanding the surveillance capacities of the state and creating new concerns for individual privacy, the Anti-Terrorism and PATRIOT Acts have also weakened longstanding due process protections and the right to a fair trial.
This general erosion of the rights of the majority brought about by these and subsequent Acts-though disturbing in and of itself-has been accompanied by a sustained attack on the freedoms of particular minorities, such as Middle Eastern and Muslim communities. Regardless of the intentions of the governments behind them, the provisions contained in these Acts represent a serious retreat from a commitment to human rights in general and a damaging attack on individual privacy in particular.
Privacy is protected as a right-albeit a qualified one-in both the UK and the US, and measures that threaten to undermine individual expectations of privacy must therefore be taken extremely seriously. 3 A great deal has been written about the changing nature of surveillance and the extent to which 9/11 has contributed to the erosion of personal privacy in many Western democracies. 4 However, the aims and provisions of the Anti-terrorism Act and the USA PATRIOT Act should also be seen as significant because they bring to the fore the complex dynamic between security, surveillance, privacy and the construction of identity. The fervour with which security has recently been pursued has not only led to more surveillance and less privacy in the UK and the US, but also contributed to a major shift in the way in which personal identity is constructed and understood by both the state and individual citizens.
In this chapter, the relationship between security, surveillance, privacy and identity will be explored, both in the context of recent legislation such as the Antiterrorism Act and the PATRIOT Act, and also in the light of ongoing changes in the ways that personal information is gathered, processed and used. In particular, it will be argued that prevailing notions of privacy-and the legal frameworks that aim to protect privacy interests-are ill-suited to defending individuals from an increasingly sophisticated array of surveillance and data processing techniques, which enable information to be acquired and shared at almost zero-cost and which threaten to establish the 'categorical identity' as the primary means by which we are known-to the state and, more disturbingly, to each other. 3 In the United Kingdom, privacy-as defined by art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)-is protected under the Human Rights Act (1998). In contrast, in the United States privacy derives its status as a right from the First, Forth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. For a discussion of privacy rights in the US, see Alderman, E and Kennedy, C, The Right to Privacy (New York, Knopf, 1995) ; and Goold, B, 'Open to All? Regulating Open Street CCTV and the Case for "Symetrical Surveillance" ' (2006) 25(1) Criminal Justice Ethics 3-17.
REMOVING BARRIERS, REDUCING PRIVACY
Speaking immediately after the signing into law of the USA PATRIOT Act in October 2001, President George W Bush observed that the Act represents a significant step towards the greater integration of law enforcement and security agencies in the United States, in part because it removes many of the barriers to interagency communication that existed prior to the events of September 11:
This legislation gives … intelligence operations and criminal operations the chance to operate not on separate tracks, but to share vital information so necessary to disrupt a terrorist attack before it occurs. As of today, we're changing the laws governing information-sharing.
5
The issue that Bush was referring to here is known generally in the US as 'linkage blindness' 6 and is now recognised as the major reason behind the failure of the American intelligence services to predict the catastrophic events of September 11. 7 In an effort to address this problem, the PATRIOT Act removed many of the In general, notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall be lawful for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence or foreign intelligence information obtained as part of a criminal investigation to be disclosed to any Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official in order to assist the official receiving that information in the performance of his official duties. Any Federal official who receives information pursuant to this provision may use that information only as is necessary in the conduct of that person's official duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such information.
Before the PATRIOT Act, domestic and foreign intelligence gathering and surveillance activities had been deliberately kept separate, in part to ensure the accountability of the various agencies responsible for such tasks and in part to protect civil liberties. 9 These agencies have now been deliberately brought together with clear instructions to intensify their activities and share whatever information they uncover.
However, the FBI, CIA, Department for Homeland Security and associated government officials have given little explicit consideration as to how this will affect the second half of the equation-the protection of civil liberties.
Although no equivalent to the Department for Homeland Security has yet been mooted for the United Kingdom, the Anti-Terrorism Act also represents a concerted attempt to improve information gathering and intelligence-sharing by the various agencies that are charged with the task of preventing terrorism and maintaining state security. 10 Prior to the events of September 11, security services such as MI5 and MI6
had never been particularly well-regulated, nor were their interactions with domestic law enforcement agencies formally constrained. 11 As a result, although there may have been concerns in some quarters about the accountability of these agencies and the extent to which Parliament was able effectively to monitor their activities, there were also few significant barriers to inter-agency co-operation and co-ordination. 18 Lyon (2001) ,.
more complex enterprise that relies less on tracking physical bodies than on tracking the data trails that individuals leave behind.
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The challenges of securing an increasingly diverse population in an increasingly complex world did not appear out of the blue; but what makes September 11 significant is that it marks the moment at which it became acceptable for governments to draw a direct and very public connection between the demand for security and the need for improved means of general surveillance, individual identification and social control. 20 As Levi and Wall have observed, since September 11 the 'surveillance-society' model of security has become increasingly viewed as legitimate, with the result that there has been a considerable increase in the power of the state. 21 While formerly a degree of separation between those responsible for internal and external security was seen as essential to the preservation of democratic government, since September 11 it has become standard practice in the US and UK to assume that breaking down the legal and institutional barriers between law enforcement and security agencies is both practical and necessary, resulting in the emergence of an all-embracing concept of 'national security'. The removal of these barriers has serious implications for individual privacy.
As many civil libertarians and privacy advocates have argued, as the surveillance power of the state expands, the number of truly private spaces available for individuals necessarily contracts, with the result that it becomes increasingly difficult for citizens to 'keep things to themselves'. 23 Furthermore, as Galison and Minow have observed, because legislation such as the Anti-terrorism Act and the USA PATRIOT Act helps to reinforce the view that it is worth sacrificing considerable amounts of privacy for the promise of security, it only exacerbates existing powerful anti-privacy trends in other areas of our social and economic lives:
[F]ailures to attend to privacy in the design of technology, the articulation and enforcement of laws, and in the mechanisms of markets and politics produce downwards spirals, reducing both the scope of experiential privacy and people's expectation of and hope for privacy.
24
The idea that individuals should be able to retain control over certain types of information about themselves and their dealings-and determine who has access to that information-underpins a number of different conceptions of the right to privacy. 25 It is also an idea that has to varying degrees found support in both British 24 Galison and Minow (2005) , note 1 above, 258.
and American law. Yet while it is clear that the pursuit of security poses a threat to this aspect of privacy, in the remaining sections of this chapter it will be argued that there are deeper issues at stake than the loss of what we may call 'informational privacy'. Privacy, it will be argued, is not simply about the keeping of secrets or the restriction of access to information. Rather, it is also about maintaining a degree of control over one's identity-an endeavour that is by nature much more indefinable and fluid but also goes to the heart of what it is to be human/maintaining human dignity. We not only help readers find books, we also help books find readers, with personalized recommendations based on the patterns we see. I remember one of the first times this struck me. The main book on the page was on Zen. There were other suggestions for Zen books, and in the middle of those was a book on how to have a clutter-free desk. That's not something that a human editor would have ever picked. But statistically, the people who were interested in the Zen books also wanted clutterfree desks. The computer is blind to the fact that these things are dissimilar in some way that's important to humans. It looks right through that and says yes, try this. And it works.
CHANGING NOTIONS OF IDENTITY: NARRATIVES AND CATEGORIES
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The growing use and sophistication of surveillance-based methods of individual classification has important implications for the relationship between the individual and the state. More specifically, a tension has emerged between two fundamentally opposed conceptions of identity: the narrative and the categorical. Although not all of these developments are technologically determined, they can clearly be traced to recent advances in surveillance, information processing and digital communication. In the past such advances were largely driven by the desire of governments to streamline decision-making and improve administrative efficiency.
However, the extremely detailed, textured profiles of citizens that are now available to states hardly seem necessary merely to distinguish individuals from one another for the purposes of tax, benefits, voting, etc. Instead, since 9/11, it is security-defined in terms of the ability of the state to protect its citizens from internal and external threats-that is the primary rationale for increasing levels of state surveillance and improving data-sharing. This has resulted in the rapid, simultaneous expansion and convergence of surveillance networks and databases in countries such as the US and UK.
Categorical identities have moreover become increasingly important, as they provide the basis for assessments of risk and pre-emptive measures aimed at increasing security. Perhaps the best example of this is the growing use of algorithmic surveillance in airports. Each time a passenger passes through airport security, various databases are drawn together, his or her categorical identity is reconstructed and automatically scrutinised, and then that identity is used to determine whether the passenger represents a threat to security. Passengers who are classified as such a threat can suddenly find themselves subjected to additional searches, questions and possible detention. Rarely, if ever, are individuals told why they are considered to be 'high risk', nor are they given opportunities to query the information or decisionmaking process that led to their 'high risk' classification. Once such a categorical identity has been established, it trumps all other competing accounts of the individual, at least insofar as matters of security are concerned.
36 36 It is important to note that the distinction between narrative and categorical identities can never be an absolute one. Clearly, some markers of identity that are typically used as the basis for the construction of categorical identities, such as race, can be self-defined and, as such, are products of personal narratives. As a consequence, although acknowledging the basic distinction between narrative and categorical identities is necessary if we are to fully understand the threat posed by various forms of surveillance and security measures, the line between the two is inevitably indistinct (particularly where a personal narrative is informed by official classification processes).
The growing reliance on categorical identities has many serious implications.
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As Calhoun has observed, the use of categorical identities has a tendency to produce repressive and discriminatory outcomes because the very notion of categorical identities favours sameness over difference and regards identity as a function of membership of a group:
[The imposition of categorical identities] allows a kind of abstraction from the concrete interactions and social relationships within which identities are constantly renegotiated, in which individuals present one identity as more salient than another, and within which individuals achieve some personal sense of continuity and balance among their various sorts of identities… The abstractness of categories encourages framing claims about them as though they offer a kind of trump card over the other identities of individuals addressed by them. This encourages an element of repression within the powerful categorical identities.
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As a case in point, a bank manager who must decide whether or not to grant a personal loan may not be willing (or allowed) to take into consideration the applicant's own account of his or her financial history; but the bank manager will almost certainly base the decision on a categorical identity made up of the applicant's credit rating, account history, employment status, etc. Even if the manager believes the applicant is sincere when he or she promises to repay the loan on time, and even if the manager believes the applicant has the means to do so, the categorical identity will almost certainly remain the primary determinant, and the loan may be refused. Aside from having the effect of reducing the applicant to a handful of numerical indicators, this process of decision-making is extremely hard to challenge.
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Regardless of how implausible the categorisation, it typically is not the organisation that utilises the classification who must justify decisions but rather the individual in question who must prove that he or she been wrongly identified-as someone who is a credit risk, who requires regular tax audits, who should be on a no-fly list, etc.
Furthermore, as the number of databases increases and the linkages between them become more complex and well established, it also becomes difficult for individuals to determine why they have been classified in a particular way in the first place.
Credit records are, for example, now based on information drawn from a vast array of sources, making it extremely difficult for the average person to uncover where any 'black mark' may have come from.
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Taken to an extreme, the use of sophisticated categorical identities by the state and private companies has the potential to undermine the way in which ordinary individuals understand themselves. Confronted with a world in which identity is increasingly defined according to the information contained in databases, where 39 Of course, it is important not to take the argument in favour of the narrative identity too far. The point here is not to suggest that we should rely only on narrative identities and ignore other information but rather to caution against the unquestioning reliance on categorical identities and the temptation of using them as trumps in decision-making. I am grateful to Simon Cole for alerting me to the danger of privileging personal narratives and thereby lapsing into 'wishy-washy humanism'. Or even more problematically, how do I argue that I still subscribe to radical political ideas but am not a terrorist risk because of a commitment to non-violence? Like a criminal record, the categorical identity has the potential to rob individuals of the right to define themselves beyond its confines and to develop as individuals.
developments since September 11 threaten to tip the balance even more in favour of categorical identities. Looked at through a different lens, it is also possible to characterise these changes in terms of the demise of administrative discretion and the emergence of a deep organisational reliance on automated decision-making.
Legislation such as the PATRIOT Act and the Anti-Terrorism Act is significant not only because it seeks to remove barriers to information sharing and to promote cooperation between law enforcement agencies, but also because it helps to reinforce the view that categorical identities based on information obtained through surveillance and generated by data-matching techniques, are the only appropriate basis of stateindividual interaction. The pursuit of security along these lines is dangerous not simply because it undermines claims to individual privacy, but because it threatens to normalise and make ubiquitous a way of constructing identity that is inherently dehumanising and has the potential to institutionalise various forms of cultural and ethnic discrimination.
Faced with a growing emphasis on security and a steadily expanding network of state and commercial surveillance, what chance do we have for resisting the shift from narrative to categorical constructions of identity? The most obvious answer to this question is of course to bolster existing privacy protections with a view to making it more difficult for the state and private companies to acquire and share personal information. However, many of the agencies and institutions that represent a threat to privacy are powerful, well-funded and closely integrated into larger state systems. Like a ball of mercury, the data-mining activities scatter and grow less visible once subjected to pressure. Public concerns about privacy have generated more secrecy about the government activities that jeopardise personal privacy.
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Given the difficulty of comprehensively protecting privacy interests through legislation and regulation, it is clear that a multi-pronged strategy is necessary to respond effectively to the growing obsession with security and surveillance. Legal and institutional reform must be accompanied by other measures that are designed to foster a general respect for privacy and to mitigate the de-humanising effects of categorical identities. With this larger aim in mind, the following section will consider several models of privacy and their implications for both security and personal identity.
PRIVACY, IDENTITY AND INFORMATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION The Value of Privacy
Privacy rights are notoriously difficult to define, in part because they often overlap with other substantive rights-such as the right to liberty-that are both wellestablished and well-defined, and also because there is often dispute over what it is 44 One of the major opponents of the TIA was the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which argued that the sort of data-mining programme envisaged for the TIA would 'amount to a picture of that privacy seeks to protect. 46 According to Thomson, a leading proponent of the right to privacy, it is impossible to define privacy because the right to privacy is in fact composed of a cluster of other rights, typically property rights and the right to bodily integrity. 47 As such, when we claim that our privacy has been violated, what
we really mean to say is that some other substantive right has been infringed upon. In this sense, privacy is a fundamentally derivative concept. information is necessarily factual and includes such things as details about one's health, marital and financial status, educational background and sexual orientation.
While he does not go so far as to claim that there is a clear legal or moral right to privacy, Parent makes clear that the loss of control over such personal information can lead to far-reaching consequences and very real effects for the lives of individuals:
[I]f others manage to obtain sensitive personal knowledge about us they will by that very fact acquire power over us. Their power could then be used to our disadvantage. The possibilities for exploitation become very real. The definite connection between harm and the invasion of privacy explains why we place a value on not having undocumented personal information about ourselves widely known.
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In contrast to this emphasis on the control of information, other writers have suggested that privacy is best understood in terms of its connection to ideas of personal autonomy, self-determination and human dignity. This approach, which frequently leads to privacy being framed in terms of the right to a private or family life, has tended to dominate legal discussion of privacy in both the US Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights. Privacy in this sense goes well beyond control over information and looks to provide individuals with the means to protect themselves against intrusions that might compromise their independence and represent an affront to their sense of human dignity.
According to Feldman, privacy rights are important because they enable individuals and groups to determine and, to some extent at least, control the boundaries between different interlocking social spheres. 53 In this regard, he argues, it is important to recognise the communitarian aspects of the idea of privacy. If we view society as a 'community of communities', made up of groups with different memberships that may or may not overlap, then privacy provides the mechanism by which these groups are able to preserve their independence while also interacting with 52 Ibid, 276.
53 See Feldman (1994) 41; and Feldman (1997) 15. one another. At the individual level as well, a notion of privacy is valuable insofar as it enables us to limit the extent to which we are subjected to the demands and judgments of others.
Within this framework, privacy rights deserve protection because they are essential for the maintenance of personal autonomy and enable individuals to maintain a range of different and valuable social relationships. 54 If we are constantly required to respond to the expectations of those around us, our choices are unlikely to be free, nor are we likely to develop a capacity for self-determination or a degree of self-fulfilment. Privacy is hence essential for the establishment and maintenance of a unique sense of self. Indeed, as Galison and Minow have observed, privacy and the construction of personal identity are intimately connected:
Even though its meanings are multiple and complex, privacy in closely connected with the emergence of a modern sense of self. Its jeopardy signals serious risk to the very conditions people need to enjoy the kind of self that can experiment, relax, form and enjoy intimate connections, and practice the development of ideas and beliefs for valued expression.
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Of course, these two approaches-privacy as the control of information and privacy as the protection of individual autonomy-are not entirely incompatible with one another. If one views control over personal information not merely in terms of a narrow conception of ownership or of secrecy but rather as essential to the maintenance of individual autonomy and dignity, then it follows that spheres of privacy are as much about controlling how information about oneself is communicated to the outside world as it is about controlling who has access to us and our activities. After all, as Lustgarten and Leigh argue, the collection of personal information without an individual's consent can amount to a serious affront to human dignity and demonstrate an absence of respect for their need for personal autonomy:
54 Feldman (1994) 53-59.
Imagine being unable to draw the curtain in your bedroom, so that others can see you naked at any time of their choosing. The fear and revulsion this image evokes has little to do with the beauty or otherwise of one's body, but everything to do with one's sense of self. If I have no control over what is known about me, I am seriously diminished as a person both in my own eyes and in those which are capable of intruding upon me.
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If we accept this view of privacy, then it follows that there is a clear relationship between privacy and the construction of personal identity. As we move from very private spheres (for example, the home) into increasingly less private ones (such as the workplace), each step requires us to surrender some amount of control over information about ourselves, information that can then be shared and its meaning potentially transformed. The more public my activities, the more susceptible they are to being known, interpreted and judged by others, with the result that my capacity to define myself-to construct my own narrative identity or to resist a categorical identity that might be imposed upon me by the state-diminishes. This is of course one of the reasons why we often feel most secure in the context of the home. It is not simply because we have considerable control over the space around us, but also because we can more or less be who we want to be.
Privacy rights are valuable then not simply because they are essential to the maintenance of personal autonomy or the defence of human dignity, or even because they endow us with some modicum of control over information about ourselves.
Privacy is important because of its relationship to the construction of identity and because of the way in which it helps us to develop and defend particular visions of self. In making a demand for privacy, we reassert control over information about ourselves and make it more difficult for those who would seek to categorise us or reduce our identity to a list of particular traits or characteristics.
An Expanded Model of Privacy
The relatively broad conception of privacy outlined above may go some way in drawing a connection between privacy and human dignity-and hence human rights-but it is unlikely on its own to provide an adequate basis for resisting the pressures of security and the attendant drive from narrative to categorical notions of identity. There are two reasons for this. First, central to even the broadest conception of privacy is the assumption that it is possible to agree on what constitutes personal information deserving of protection. Yet as Nissenbaum has argued, the meaning of any piece of information is at least in part determined by its context and the manner in which it is disclosed. The fact that I choose to behave or present myself in a certain way in one context does not mean that I intend to be defined by behaviour and identity in all other contexts. As Schoeman has rightly observed,
A person can be active in the gay pride movement in San Francisco, but be private about her sexual preferences vis-à-vis her family and co-workers in Sacramento. A professor may be highly visible to other gays at the gay bar but discreet about sexual orientation at the university. Surely the streets and newspapers of San Francisco are public places as are the gay bars in the quiet university town. Does appearing in some public settings as a gay activist mean that the person concerned has waived her rights to civil inattention, to feeling violated if confronted in another setting?
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In a world in which surveillance is becoming ubiquitous and information can be transmitted almost instantaneously to a multitude of people at virtually zero cost, it is exceptionally easy for that information to be divorced from its context and for it to take on new and unexpected meanings. As a consequence, if we are to maintain any sense of privacy or control over how our identity is constructed, it is important to develop a concept of privacy that recognises that the meaning of information is 57 Schoeman, F, , Good Gossip heavily context dependent and can easily be transformed, abused and/or misinterpreted.
Nissenbaum has suggested that the solution to this problem is to develop a model of privacy that is capable of maintaining 'contextual integrity', which is defined as 'compatibility with presiding norms of information appropriateness and distribution '. 58 According to this principle, we should move away from thinking about privacy in terms of dichotomies-such as sensitive and non-sensitive information, or distinctly private and distinctly public spaces-and instead recognise that all areas of life are subject to flows of information:
Observing the texture of people's lives, we find them not only crossing dichotomies, but moving about, into, and out of a plurality of distinct realms. They are at home with families, they go to work, they seek medical care, visit friends, consult with psychiatrists, talk with lawyers, go to the bank, attend religious services, vote, shop, and more. Each of these spheres, realms, or contexts involves, indeed may even be defined by, a distinct set of norms, which governs its various aspects such as roles, expectations, actions, and practices. For certain contexts, such as the highly ritualized settings of many church services, these norms are explicit and quite specific. For others, the norms may be implicit, variable, and incomplete (or partial)… Contexts, or spheres, offer a platform for a normative account of privacy in terms of contextual integrity.
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The second, related reason why many existing models of privacy are unable to respond to the challenges of modern surveillance and the current overwhelming drive for security is that they-unlike many of the technologies that now threaten privacyare rooted in an increasingly anachronistic view of the distinction between the public and the private. Modern information flows do not respect traditional physical boundaries: for example, when I surf publicly accessible internet sites in the privacy of my own home, am I moving in a private or a public domain? Moreover, many state institutions now draw on personal information that is collected by the private sector or has otherwise found its way into the public domain. As a consequence, privacy 58 Nissenbaum (2004) 137.
59 Ibid, protections that can only be enforced against public bodies-such as the data protection provisions currently in operation in the United Kingdom-are severely limited in their application.
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In light of these difficulties, it is clear that if we are concerned about privacy and the effect that the current obsession with security is having on our ability to maintain control over our own identities, we must develop a new vision of privacy that recognises the importance of context and the increasing irrelevance of traditional notions of the public/private divide. The language and discourse of privacy must, as a basic starting point, acknowledge the deep connection between information and identity, while privacy protections must recognise that the meaning of information and informational norms-that is, the norms of appropriateness and distributionvary according to context. Such a vision of privacy would represent a significant departure from the models that underpin the privacy and data protection laws of the US and UK. Furthermore, it almost certainly represents a departure form the way in which most people think about questions of privacy in their everyday lives. Yet just as we have come to accept that the nature and extent of surveillance has changed in recent years, so too must society begin to think more creatively and radically about the concept of privacy and the value of identity.
Informational Self-determination
Assuming that we are prepared to embrace a concept of privacy such as that outlined above, the question then arises as to how best to protect the privacy interests that arise from such a model. It is tempting to assume that all that is needed to achieve 60 Furthermore, given the pressures associated with the pursuit of security, it makes little sense to entrust the state-via the courts or some external agency such as the Office of the Data Protection Commissioner-to both define and then police the boundary between the public and the private.
this are more expansive privacy laws. However, as Galison and Minow have argued, it may be possible to enact legislation that discourages the state from invading the privacy of individuals, but it is impossible to construct a system of laws that will provide for the complete protection of privacy or resolve the inevitable conflict between privacy and the demands of security. 61 Instead, what is needed is a multidimensional strategy that not only seeks to transform the way in which the law defines and protects privacy, but also generates a general demand for privacy within society:
Without deliberate effort [to promote privacy] a downward spiral can become a vicious circle, eroding privacy through legal permission, technological access to unprecedented amounts of personal information, and diminishing public expectations of privacy. Deliberate initiatives in law, technology, and market and educational strategies designed to generate desire could, in contrast, promote an upward spiral, moving up while rotating back and forth between positive desires on the one side and legal/technological constraints on the other.
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Although it is well beyond the scope of this chapter to outline a comprehensive strategy for the promotion of individual privacy, one way in which privacy could be enhanced in the US and the UK is the introduction of a free-standing right to informational self-determination. Insofar as such a right would increase the amount of control that individuals are able to exercise over personal information, its introduction would constitute an important step towards the development of a vision of privacy that properly recognises the fluid and contextual nature of information in modern society.
As has already been noted, in order to resist the unwanted imposition of a categorical identity, it is crucial that individuals are able to determine or at least have a say in what sorts of personal information are held by the state and, even more importantly, how that information is used. While data protection laws go some way to providing this, they typically focus on only regulating the manner in which 61 Galison and Minow (2005) infringe upon an individual's autonomy and his or her expectation to be able to control how that personal information is used. Finally, the right to informational selfdetermination has the advantage of not being contingent on transgressions of some imagined boundary between private and public space; it is therefore better equipped to protect individual interests in a world of information flows. 65 It is important to note, however, that concerns about the scope of the right to informational self-Given the existence of this right, it is perhaps unsurprising that despite similar calls for an expansion in state surveillance and the extension of existing security legislation, no equivalent of the PATRIOT Act or the Anti-terrorism Act has as yet been enacted in Germany. In the face of a strong constitutional commitment to the idea that individuals have a right to determine how information about themselves is used, it is difficult for the government, regardless of the public mood, to centralise the collection of personal details and remove institutional checks on the sharing of information in the way that has occurred in the US and UK since 9/11. Recognising such a right in the US or UK context may not provide an unassailable defence against the excessive surveillance demands of the state or the growing use of categorical identities, but it deserves serious consideration if only because it would add a new and substantial level of protection for privacy at a time when other protections are either failing or being fatally undermined.
In addition, thinking about privacy in terms of informational selfdetermination and attempting to shift current political and legal debates such that the onus is on the state to better justify the expansion of security-related surveillance powers may have other benefits that go beyond bolstering existing individual privacy protections. Closely related to the idea of informational self-determination is the notion that it is possible to own information about oneself, and as such one of the arguments in favour of the new right is that it may open the door to broader discussions about the possible economic value of privacy.
At present, we assume that once an individual (either willingly or unwillingly) reveals information about him-or herself, that individual's interest in and claim over that information is substantially weakened. He or she may attempt to prevent others from receiving that information or to stop it from being used by certain organisations, but there is no suggestion that such assertions of control are based on clear ownership or concepts of property. If, however, someone who possessed or used information about another individual were required to financially compensate that person-that is, required to pay for the privilege of required to pay for the privilege of using someone else's personal information and asserting a form of control over it-then it is possible that the use of categorical identities and certain types of surveillance and data matching would naturally be constrained. 66 Governments and organisations would, it seems reasonable to assume, think twice about acquiring information or sharing it if, in just the same way copyright royalties are paid to artists, they may also have to pay the individuals to whom the information pertains.
Although such a market in personal information may be no more likely to come into being than Brin's 'transparent society', thinking about the applications and limits of the right to informational self-determination along these lines does provide the basis for the formulation/conception/conceptualisation of new ways of both resisting the imposition of categorical identities and reasserting the collective and individual interest in privacy.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, an attempt has been made to show how the pursuit of security and the continued expansion in state surveillance affect privacy and identity. Although it is clear that legislation such as the Anti-terrorism Act and the PATRIOT Act represents a threat to many well-established human rights-such as the right to silence and the 66 I am indebted to Kevin Haggerty for first raising the question of a potential market in personal information, and for providing various insights into the implications for privacy and surveillance of making users of that information pay for it. It is an intriguing and powerful idea that I hope he will take up in print.
right to a fair trial-there is a danger that because liberals and civil libertarians continue to focus much of their attention on the threat to these fundamental civil liberties, we risk losing sight of the fact that many other less well-defined but no less important rights-including, namely, privacy-are being gradually worn away.
Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that although the events of September 11
were enormously significant in terms of shifting the balance in the security-rights debate, many of the threats to individual freedom and autonomy that now appear so clearly have in fact been present for a very long time.
Security, surveillance, identity and privacy are intimately connected. As states attempt to increase their ability to defend their citizens from external and internal threats, they also necessarily risk undermining the ability of the individuals within their borders to live free from scrutiny, suspicion, categorisation and discrimination.
Many existing privacy protections are incapable of addressing the underlying challenges posed by the pursuit of security because they were developed during a time in which the distinction between the public and private was much clearer than it is today, and because the costs of acquiring, processing and sharing information were once much higher than they are today. If we are to maintain some degree of control about the way in which our identities are constructed and used, it is essential not only to begin to think about what identity and privacy mean, but also to take positive steps to develop legal and other means of resisting state demands to submit to categorisation and control. Unless we do so, regardless of whether we are more secure from physical threats, we may end up surrendering our identities-and in the process, surrender a part of ourselves.
